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THE END OF ARBITRATION AS WE KNOW IT? ARBITRATION UNDER ATTACK
By
David Allen Larson*
I.

INTRODUCTION
During the past few years arbitration has been under attack. Recent judicial

decisions, newly enacted and proposed legislation, and populist sentiments are
important and obviously can result in significant changes. But many of the
criticisms leveled at arbitration can be addressed and, most significantly, there are
practical and inescapable realities that will ensure arbitration’s survival.
Arbitration’s viability as a popular and effective dispute resolution process
will continue as a result of powerful economic, cultural, and social developments.
The increasing and worrisome inability of state governments to adequately fund
the judiciary, combined with the fact that, as a society, we continue to integrate
technology into every aspect of our lives, guarantees that arbitration will remain
the dispute resolution process of choice in many circumstances. But we must keep
in mind that as we move forward, practices and procedures that we take for granted
today may no longer be available.
This article will explain how state governments’ budget challenges and
society’s increasing migration to technology will strengthen arbitration’s status as
a convenient and effective dispute resolution process. The article will identify and
discuss the most noteworthy attacks on arbitration and explain why these attacks
will not be fatal. Finally, recent United States Supreme Court cases Rent-A-Center,
West, Inc. v. Jackson1 and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,2
*Professor of Law, Senior Fellow and former Director, Dispute Resolution Institute,
Hamline University School of Law. Professor Larson was the founder and Editor-In-Chief
of the Journal of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, a Hearing Examiner for
the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission, an arbitrator for the Omaha Tribe, and
currently serves as an independent arbitrator. Professor Larson is Chairperson for the
American Bar Association Law School Division Arbitration Competition. He was a
member of the American Bar Association’s E-commerce and ADR Task Force and a U.S.
West Technology Fellow. He is a Qualified Neutral under Minnesota Supreme Court Rule
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and pending United States Supreme Court case AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,3
will be summarized and the impact of those cases on the future of arbitration will
be discussed.
II.

STATE GOVERNMENTS CANNOT ADEQUATELY FUND THE JUDICIARY
State governments around the county are experiencing unprecedented

budget deficits and the situation may get worse before it gets better. In states
where the median age of the population is rising, the situation in the author’s state
of Minnesota for example, an increasing number of residents will pay income tax
at a lower rate when they retire than they are paying today and state revenues will
decline as a result.4
California far and away is the state leader in terms of the largest dollar
deficit with a stunning predicted budget deficit of $24.5 billion.5 Other states with
smaller overall budgets are similarly challenged. Illinois has a predicted $15 billion
deficit6 and Pennsylvania, our location for this well-planned and timely
symposium, has a predicted deficit of $4 billion.7 Minnesota originally had a

114, his recent articles are available at http://ssrn.com/author=709717, and he can be
contacted at dlarson@hamline.edu.
1
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
2
130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
3
No. 09-893 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2010). Docketed 09-893 (May 24, 2010).
4
Eric J. Magnuson, The State of the Judiciary, 67 no. 7 Bench & BAR OF MINNESOTA 20,
23 (Aug. 2010).
5
California Officer of Legislative Analysis, The 2011-2012 Budget: California’s Fiscal
Outlook
(2010),
available
at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2010/bud/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_2010.aspx#chap1.
6
Illinois Lawmakers Propose 75 Percent Income Tax Hike, CBS Chicago, Jan. 6, 2011,
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2011/01/06/tax-increase-plan-bigger-than-expected/
(last
visited Apr. 10, 2011).
7
Brad Bumsed, Pennsylvania’s $4 billion deficit not as high as other states’, PITTSBURGH
TRIBUNE-REVIEW,
Jan.
8,
2011,
available
at
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_717237.html.
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projected deficit of $6.2 billion8 but subsequently discovered that the projected
deficit is “only” $5 billion.9
So the desperate question that predictably will cause increased hand
wringing is “what to do, what to do?” Given the dire circumstances, some are
advocating across the board cuts in spending. On March 27, 2011 Minnesota
Public Radio (MPR News) in cooperation with the Citizens League initiated an
ongoing, online discussion that asks Minnesota residents to indicate whether they
would support across the board spending cuts.10 Initiating the conversation, the
MPR News online video cites a Wilder Foundation survey that reported that thirty
percent of the Minnesota residents surveyed would support across the board cuts so
long as the cuts were short term.11
Anyone who pays attention to the media knows that many state legislators
are determined to implement substantial cuts in spending. The Republican Party
now controls both Houses in the Minnesota legislature, for example. On Feb. 10,
2011, new Democratic Gov. Mark Dayton vetoed a Republican-drafted budget
proposal that cut $824 million from the next 2-year budget and also cut an
additional $100 million from the current budget ending June 2011.12
In order to understand what cuts of this magnitude would mean for the
court system one needs to know what it costs to operate the judicial branch. In
Minnesota, the judiciary’s budget is allocated in the following manner:

8

MINN. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC FORECAST (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.mmb.state.mn.us/doc/fu/10/summary-nov10.pdf; Memorandum from Steve
Sviggum, Comm’r of Minn. Mgmt. & Budget to the Legislative Reference Library, Chief
Clerk of the House of Representatives, and Sec’y of the Senate (Dec. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.mmb.state.mn.us/doc/bonds/debt-cap/forecast-nov-10.pdf.
9
MINN. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC FORECAST (Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.mmb.state.mn.us/doc/fu/11/summary-feb11.pdf.
10
MPR
News,
March
27,
2011
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/special/columns/statewide/archive/rundown/.
11
Id. (found at 1:20 of the 1:42 video). Wilder Foundation report that thirty percent support
across the board cuts.
12
Mike Kaszuba, Fight Is On As Dayton Vetoes GOP Cuts, STARTRIBUNE, Feb. 11,
2011, http://www.startribune.com/politics/local/115809399.html.
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District Courts- $247,384,000



Supreme Court/State Court Administration- $42,997,000



Court of Appeals- $10,178,000



Total - $300,559,00013

Even before the specter of across the board cuts raised its unsettling head, jurists
were sounding the alarm that judicial standards could not be maintained at current
funding levels. After just 2 years on the bench, Minnesota Supreme Court Chief
Justice Eric Magnuson left the bench in June 2010. Chief Justice Magnuson had
complained frequently and publicly that the court system was underfunded and
facing a crisis. One month before resigning he declared he was "disappointed" that
then Governor Tim Pawlenty proposed a cut to judicial budgets "at a time when
our base budgets are already insufficient.”14
On June 24, 2010, in his last speech to the Minnesota State Bar
Association in the role of Chief Justice, Magnuson explained that the Minnesota
Judicial branch had over 250 staff vacancies and twenty-four fewer judges than
needed.15 As a result, for many cases the time required to finally bring the case to
trial had doubled.16 It was taking more than a year to bring one out of every four
serious felonies to trial; conciliation court cases required six to eight months before
there was a hearing; and public services, staff hours and wages were being cut.17
State budgets are in turmoil and legislators must make significant cuts.
Underfunded court systems that already were carefully rationing resources will
have to find additional ways to reduce expenditures, which probably will require a
further reduction in services. As a result and as a simple, practical matter, the
13

Minnesota Judicial Branch, Fast Facts about the Judicial Branch,
http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=432.
14
Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Magnuson Steps Down As State’s Chief Justice,
STARTRIBUNE,
Mar. 11, 2010, http://www.startribune.com/politics/87368147.html?source=error.
15
Magnuson, supra note 4.
16
Id.
17
Id.
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Judiciary needs healthy arbitral institutions and smoothly functioning arbitral
processes.
Because justice delayed is justice denied, due process demands that
disputes be addressed as quickly and efficiently as possible, a task that becomes
more challenging for court systems with every budget cut. The goal is not merely
aspirational. State constitutions impose critical obligations on state court systems.18
Arbitration currently is, and increasingly will be, valued (and protected) as
a way to mitigate pressures on the judiciary. At the risk of sounding too cynical,
the author believes that judges will hesitate to write opinions that limit the
enforceability of arbitration clauses or limit arbitrators’ authority at the outset of a
dispute. Judges will be strongly motivated to defer to arbitration when asked to
stay arbitral proceedings because judges simply cannot afford to make an
increasingly unmanageable situation even worse.
You may not be convinced, or not sufficiently cynical to believe, that
financial exigencies will force judges to formulate and embrace a pro-arbitration
jurisprudence that not only protects, but may exceed, the current deferential
approach to arbitration. But budget challenges will require adaptations that will
affirm, and perhaps strengthen, the role arbitration plays in the administration of
justice, independent of the jurisprudential approaches that judges craft. As budgets
continue to be cut, governors will be in no hurry to make judicial appointments and
it is likely that judgeships may remain vacant for unprecedented amounts of time.
And even though populations may increase, it may be difficult to persuade
legislators to increase the number of judges accordingly.
As a result, courts may try (and may need) to integrate arbitration more
formally and more closely into the judicial process. If there are not enough judges
to handle all the demands on their time, then one solution would be to free judges
18

Id. (citing the words of former Minnesota Chief Justice Eric Magnuson, “[t]he first
substantive provision of our constitution states the object of government is to provide for
the ‘security, benefit and protection of the people.’ Government achieves this directive by
making laws and enforcing them through its justice system. To fulfill this basic mandate,
government must have a fully functioning justice system”).
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from the more mundane of their responsibilities and allow them to concentrate on
complex tasks. Rather than contemplating only the traditional option of essentially
displacing the court system with arbitration, the time may have come for state
court systems to consider increased reliance on arbitrators to handle discovery
issues and preliminary motions. But even if this does not happen, arbitration will
be protected and likely will increase.
III.

TECHNOLOGY FACILITATED
EXPECT/DEMAND IT

ARBITRATION

–

BARTIES

WILL

The author has been writing and speaking about technology mediated
dispute resolution (TMDR) for the past decade and is convinced that dispute
resolution processes increasingly will rely on technology.19 TMDR includes Online
Dispute Resolution (ODR), but adds cellular telephones, satellite communications,
tele-immersion, video conferencing, avatars and virtual personalities, and artificial
intelligence software and devices (including robots). Technology is advancing and
being embraced at, well, warp speed.20 For instance, the average thirteen to
seventeen year old teenager sends 3,339 text messages per month (more than 100
per day) and billions of tweets are sent per month.21

19

See David Allen Larson, Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars, and the Demise of the
Human
Mediator, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 105,105-07 (2010); David Allen Larson,
Technology Mediated
Dispute Resolution (TMDR): A New Paradigm for ADR, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
629, 633-34 (2006); David Allen Larson, Technology Mediated Dispute Resolution
(TMDR): Opportunities and Dangers, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 213, 214 (2006); see generally,
David Allen Larsen, Online Dispute Resolution: Do You Know Where Your Children Are?,
19 Negotiation J. 199 (2003).
20
“Warp speed” is a term developed in science fiction to describe the way that space-time
warps can be used to allow faster-than-light travel, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, available
at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/warp%20speed. It is, to put it simply,
extraordinarily fast.
21
Katherine Rosman, Y U Love Texts, H8 Calls, WALL ST. J.,(Oct. 14, 2010), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703673604575550201949192336.html?K
EYWORDS=y+u+love+texts.
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We are in the midst of a Technology Revolution, the most significant
cultural and social change since the industrial revolution. We are experiencing
fundamental changes in the ways in which we communicate and interact through
our reliance, and increasing dependence, on the Internet, digital technology and
Web 2.0 (user created content). In our children we are witnessing a generation
being raised on technology, learning to utilize technology intuitively (as digital
natives) as opposed to the way that I, and probably you, understand technology (as
digital immigrants). For many of us, traditional separations between work/personal
time and physical/virtual reality are being eviscerated.
Generation Y is just one of the many terms used to describe young adults
who also have been labeled “The Boomerang Generation” because of their
inclination to move back in with their parents after living independently.22 Also
known as Millennials, these individuals are the children of post WWII Baby
Boomers with birth dates ranging somewhere from the late 1970s to the early
2000s.23 Millennials embrace multiple forms of expression, three quarters have a
profile on a social networking site, one in five have posted a video of themselves
online, and many Millenials say their use of social media is what distinguishes
their generation.24 Text messaging is a preferred medium of communication (1.5
trillion text messages were sent in 2009,25 which is two years ago and a veritable
lifetime when it comes to technology) and one-third of online 18-29 year olds post
or read status updates.26

22

Deborah Rothberg, Generation Y for Dummies, eWeek.com (August 24, 2006) available
at http://www.eweek.com/c/a/IT-Management/Generation-Y-for-Dummies/.
23
Millenials
(millennial
generation),
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/millennials.html.
24
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Millennials a Portrait of the Generation Next (2010), available
at
http://pewsocialtrends.org/assets/pdf/millennials-confident-connected-open-tochange.pdf.
25
CTIA, The Wireless Association Announces Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey
Results (2010), available at http://www.ctia.org/media/press/body.cfm/prid/1936.
26
Amanda Lenhart, et al., Social Media and Young Adults, PEWINTERNET, Feb. 3, 2010,
available
at
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-YoungAdults.aspx?r=1.
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This generation soon will enter adulthood. They not only will expect, they

will demand, that the problem solvers and dispute resolvers they employ will be
comfortable and capable with the technologies that they use on a daily, and hourly,
basis.

Fortunately,

arbitration

is

well

suited

to

technology

facilitated

communications. And with its streamlined procedures and flexibility, it certainly is
better suited to TMDR than litigation.
Long time arbitrators, of course, have relied on technology for decades.
Arbitrators have used the telephone and fax machine for many years, for instance,
and have more recently added e-mail and perhaps video. “Document only”
arbitrations have been available for decades and are essentially identical to the text
based arbitrations that can take place online.27 And even if a digital immigrant
feels that he or she cannot function effectively as an arbitrator or as an advocate
without physical (as opposed to virtual) face-to-face interaction, digital natives will
not feel the same constraints.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that as we
increase our understanding of the power and potential of artificial intelligence, we
will be able to integrate artificial intelligence into our arbitral processes in ways
that will lower the cost of arbitration while at the same time improving outcomes.28
As arbitration integrates technology into its processes, we need to be
attentive to potential dangers and new issues. Will technology mediated arbitration
be so similar to traditional arbitration that we can rely on the same rules, or do we
need to draft new rules? Should reviewability standards for technology facilitated
arbitration, for example, be the same as the rules for traditional, off-line
27

The author has served as the arbitrator in more than sixty document only arbitrations and
perceives little difference between a document only arbitration and an arbitration that
takes place online. In fact, because physical documents do not need to be exchanged, the
online arbitration likely will proceed much more quickly. And if the parties decide they
want to interact face to face, that interaction can be arranged much more quickly and
inexpensively by using video rather than by making travel arrangements to a common
destination.
28
See David Allen Larson, “Brother Can You Spare a Dime?” Technology Can Reduce
Dispute Resolution Costs When Times Are Tough and Improve Outcomes, 11 Nev. L.J. 523
(2011).
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arbitration? More specifically, are we comfortable relying on the same limited
scope of review that is available under the Federal Arbitration Act,29 for instance,
or do we need new standards of review that take into account the dangers inherent
in technology? Will hardware and software discrepancies among the parties, or
power imbalances due to familiarity with technology, mean that the scope of
judicial review will have to expand? We may need to expand the scope of our
award review and focus not only on the arbitrator’s conduct, but the characteristics
of the technology chosen and the way that technology is employed.
Anyone who has seen teenagers texting each other when they are on the
opposite side of the same room understands that Millennials are not only
comfortable with, but may prefer, technology facilitated communication. They will
guarantee that increasing levels of technology will be integrated into our dispute
resolution processes.
Arbitration can and will work with technology, but we must keep in mind
that platform design matters. Technology Mediated Dispute Resolution will
experience significant growth when TMDR service providers and neutrals follow
rather than lead. When technology mediated arbitration platforms and formats are
designed to track technology users’ day to day practices and patterns, then
technology facilitated arbitration will expand exponentially and arbitration’s place
in the world of dispute resolution processes will be enhanced.

29

See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §10 (2009). stating that an arbitral award may be
vacated:
1. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
2. Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced.
4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made.
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IV.

ARBITRATION IS UNDER ATTACK
This section is not intended to be an exhaustive presentation of all the

attacks that have been directed at arbitration, but rather is intended to illustrate the
types of challenges being leveled, and the actions being taken, to limit arbitration.
Arbitration has experienced increasing criticism in recent years and it would be
disingenuous, and in fact dishonest, to maintain that all of the criticism is
unwarranted. Courts, legislatures, and commentators have been specific about the
arbitral procedures and practices that they believe must be reformed.
The attacks, however, will not prove fatal. Facing charges of
unenforceability and unconscionably, companies are beginning to revise their
arbitration agreements in order to make those agreements much more consumer
friendly and, thus, ensure enforceability.30 Combine this fact with the reality that
court systems increasingly must rely on dispute resolution processes, along with
the fact that arbitration is well-suited to technology facilitated communication, and
the unavoidable conclusion is that arbitration will survive.
Much of the criticism regarding arbitration has been leveled at predispute
mandatory arbitration provisions. Legislative efforts to limit predispute arbitration,
for instance, include the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act,

31

which provides a mandate for the new Bureau of Consumer Financial

Protection to study and report to Congress regarding the use of mandatory
predispute arbitration in consumer financial services.32 Based on its findings, the

30

See, e,g., The revised, more consumer friendly language in the arbitration agreement that
is at issue in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 45 (U.S. 2010).
31
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376-2223 (2010) (hereinafter ‘Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act’), 111th Cong.
(2010).
32
Id. § 1028 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5518) ((a) STUDY AND REPORT.—The Bureau
shall conduct a study of, and shall provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and
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Bureau has rulemaking authority to "prohibit or impose conditions or limitations
on the use of" mandatory arbitration clauses.”33 This legislation also grants the
Securities Exchange Commission substantial authority to regulate the use of
arbitration to resolve securities disputes.34 Mandatory arbitration is prohibited for
securities fraud35 and commodities fraud36 whistleblowers.

And mandatory

arbitration cannot be required for mortgage and home equity loans.37
Broad limiting provisions of the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act,38
which at the time of this article still has not been enacted (and which frankly
appears to have lost some of its initial momentum)39 is a blatantly heated response
to, and rejection of, predispute mandatory arbitration clauses. The presence of
these clauses in consumer credit contracts, franchise agreements and employment
contracts are the focus of this proposed legislation. The legislation asserts that “no
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires
arbitration of (1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute; or (2) a dispute
arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights.”40 The proposed
legislation, which is short and to the point, declares in Section 2 that:

consumers in connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or
services).
33
Id. ((b) FURTHER AUTHORITY.—The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose
conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any
future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition
of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.
The findings in such rule shall be consistent with the study conducted under subsection
(a)).
34
Id. § 921 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o & § 80b-5).
35
Id. § 922.
36
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act § 748.
37
Id. § 1414.
38
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (hereinafter ‘Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009’).
39
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (the author suspects that any momentum that
has been lost regarding the Arbitration Fairness Act may be recaptured after the Supreme
Court issues its decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion).
40
See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 § 4.

104

ARBITRATOR AS JUDGE… AND JUDGE OF JURISDICTION SYMPOSIUM
Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public
law for civil rights and consumer rights, because there is no
meaningful judicial review of arbitrators' decisions. With the
knowledge that their rulings will not be seriously examined
by a court applying current law, arbitrators enjoy near
complete freedom to ignore the law and even their own
rules.41

At the time of this article, it appears that the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act has
stalled and will not be enacted any time soon.42 Predispute mandatory arbitration
clauses continue to be challenged as unenforceable, however, based on state
contract law. Nonetheless, in the absence of sweeping prohibitive legislation,
predispute arbitration agreements are not going to disappear.

Arbitration

agreements will not be held per se unenforceable on state common law grounds
when those agreements are revised to be much more consumer/employee friendly
in terms of costs, venue, timeliness and damages.
As the voices criticizing arbitration appear to get stronger, or at least
louder, we learned on Jan. 20, 2011, that a historically stalwart proponent of
deferral to arbitration, the National Labor Relations Board, may be changing
course.

Thus it may be appropriate to ask, “et tu NLRB?”

In a recent

Memorandum the Board’s General Counsel announced that:
[T]he Board’s current post-arbitral deferral policy is
distinctly at odds with that which prevails in other areas of
41

See id. § 2 (one reasonably can assume that the drafters believe that arbitrators are
ignoring the law and their own rules).
42
Deficit reduction concerns appear to the primary, and sometimes even the sole, focus of
the national and state legislatures to the exclusion of other issues. But see the final sentence
of this article before the Conclusion section, suggesting that the Supreme Court’s
forthcoming decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion may breathe new life into H.R.
1020, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, Rep. Johnson, Henry Hank (introduced Feb 12,
2009), infra at pg. 36.
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employment law. …[it is] the Board’s obligation to ensure
the protection of employees’ statutory rights prior to
exercising its discretion to defer to an arbitrator’s award,
rather than providing an even lower standard of protection of
statutory rights, as does the current deferral framework.”43
(emphasis added)
The General Counsel adds that:
[T]he party urging deferral must demonstrate that: (1) the
contract had the statutory right incorporated in it or the
parties presented the statutory issue to the arbitrator; (2) and
the arbitrator correctly enunciated the applicable statutory
principles, and applied them in deciding the issue.44
(emphasis added)
The General Counsel concludes by stating that if the party urging deferral can
satisfy this standard, then the Board should defer unless the award is “clearly
repugnant.”45 An award is clearly repugnant if it reaches a result that is “palpably
wrong.”46 Now required to explain a growing list of terms of art, the General
Counsel adds that an arbitrator’s award is palpably wrong if it “is not susceptible
to an interpretation consistent with the Act.”47

43

Acting General Counsel, Guideline Memorandum Concerning Deferral to Arbitral
Awards and Grievance Settlements in Section 8(a)1 and (3) cases to All Regional
Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers of National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) General Counsel Memorandum GC 11-05 (Jan 20, 2011) available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458043b761.
44
Id. at 6-7.
45
Id. at 7.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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Although labor arbitration is not subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, but

instead falls under the jurisdiction of Section 301 of the Labor Management and
Reporting Act of 1947,48 the General Counsel’s proposed change in enforcement
policy is noteworthy. Anyone familiar with labor law is well acquainted with three
Supreme Court cases decided in the 1960s commonly referred to as the
Steelworkers Trilogy.49 Those three cases implicitly acknowledge that disputes
arising out of collective bargaining agreements number in the thousands every year
and that our justice system depends upon experienced labor arbitrators to resolve
those disputes. Arbitral awards were declared enforceable so long as an award
“draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.”50 The Court declared
in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp. that:
[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the
arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract,
the courts have no business overruling him because their
interpretation of the contract is different from his.51
Back in the midst of the Great Depression when Congress was drafting the Wagner
Act,52 the legislation that later became the National Labor Relations Act, Congress
understood that if parties are allowed to control their own dispute resolution
process it is more likely that parties will own, respect and honor the result of that
process. In fact, the National Labor Relations Act states in no uncertain terms:
48

Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sections 141-197 (enacted Jun
23, 1947).
49
United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Ent. Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
50
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
51
Id. at 599.
52
49 Stat. 449 (1935).
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Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and
promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by
encouraging

practices

fundamental

to

the

friendly

adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as
to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by
restoring equality of bargaining power between employers
and employees.53 (emphasis added)
If parties are going to be allowed to own their disputes, then by definition judicial
review must be limited. The parties will have to take responsibility for the process
and results. The expectation is that parties will respect the arbitral awards
generated by a dispute process they chose and designed and will not resort instead
to actions that will lead to “industrial strife and unrest.” Once courts and
administrative agencies expand their review and control of those awards, however,
the sense that this result was “ours and we own it” begins to disappear.
The fact that the General Counsel is recommending that the National
Relations Board expand its review of arbitral decisions suggests that the trust once
accorded labor arbitrators is waning. The historically paramount goal of ensuring
industrial peace by assuming a “hands off” approach to privately negotiated,
collectively bargained, labor arbitration processes is being compromised by a new
focus on both the conduct and competence of the arbitrators and the integrity of the
arbitration process itself. But given the current climate the General Counsel may
have concluded that it had little choice but to increase the degree of scrutiny

53

29 U.S.C. § 151 (2010).
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arbitral awards receive, consistent with a general trend to increase scope of review
on the “back end,” after the award has issued.
Finally, commentators have been battling back and forth regarding the
merits of arbitration. Those familiar with the debate are well aware of the highly
critical reports published by the nonprofit organization Public Citizen. Claiming
“stunning”

results

that

disadvantage

consumers,

biased

decisionmakers,

suspiciously secret proceedings, and a lack of due process protections,54 Public
Citizen’s attacks on the use of predispute binding arbitration in the credit card
industry have been instrumental in exposing questionable and unfair practices in
that industry. Other commentators asserted, however, that many of Public Citizen’s
claims were exaggerated and that a closer look reveals that consumers were not
nearly as disadvantaged as Public Citizen claimed.55 Thus began an exchange
among commentators challenging each other’s data and conclusions.56
The Searle Civil Justice Institute Task Force on Consumer Arbitration then
conducted a broad-based study of consumer arbitrations administered by the
American Arbitration Association (AAA).57 Described as an empirically based
study, the 139 page (as published) Searle Report suggests that consumers do not
fare nearly as badly in AAA’s arbitrations as many have claimed.58 The Searle
report concludes that much empirical work needs to be done, however, and that

54

Public Citizen, How the Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers, p. 2 (Sept. 2007),
http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7545.
55
See Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration – A Good Deal for Consumers: A Response to Public
Citizen,
Chamber
of
Commerce
Institute
for
Legal
Reform
(2008),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=1091.
56
Compare, e.g., Public Citizen, The Arbitration Debate Trap: How Opponents of
Corporate Accountability Distort the Debate on Arbitration (July 2008),
http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7589, with Sarah Rudolph
Cole and Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration, 15 Disp. Resol.
Magazine 1 (Fall 2008).
57
Consumer Arbitration Task Force Searle Civil Justice Institute, Consumer Arbitration
Before the American Arbitration Association, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and
Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law (March 2009).
58
Id. at 111–112.
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any conclusions that can be drawn from its research are limited.59 Assuming the
correctness of the Searle Institute’s assertion that additional empirical work is
essential, one can conclude that while commentators’ articles may continue to
inflame passions, those articles will not immediately determine the future of
arbitration.
V.

SUPREME COURT CASES

A.

Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson
In Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson,60 the plaintiff Jackson filed an

employment discrimination suit in Nevada federal court against his former
employer Rent-A-Center. Four years before filing this lawsuit, Jackson had signed
a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” as a condition of employment.61 The
“Claims Covered by Agreement” section provides for arbitration of all “past,
present or future” disputes arising out of employment with Rent-A-Center.62 The
“Arbitration Procedures” section adds that “the Arbitrator…shall have exclusive
authority to resolve any dispute relating to the…enforceability…of this Agreement
including, but not limited to, any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is
void or voidable.”63 At first glance it might appear that this provision is
unambiguous and straightforward. The issue in this case, however, was whether
the second provision, identified as the “delegation provision,” is unenforceable
because it is unconscionable.64
In an opinion that references many of the seminal Supreme Court
decisions regarding arbitration, the Court first notes that because arbitration is “a
59

Id. at 113.
Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
61
Id. at 2775.
62
Id. at 2777.
63
Id.
64
Id.
60
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matter of contract,” parties can agree to arbitrate “arbitrability” questions.65
Agreements to arbitrate “gateway” issues (such as the question of whether an
arbitration agreement covers a specific issue) are merely additional, enforceable,
antecedent arbitration agreements.66 When parties clearly and unmistakably agree
that arbitrators should decide whether parties have entered into a valid contract,
courts should enforce that agreement.67 Thus in Rent-A-Center, the Court embraces
the position that when the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is in issue, the
consent of the parties is the key consideration and we must respect the freedom of
contract principle.
So what is the result when this analytical approach is applied to the RentA-Center facts? More precisely, who should decide whether the Rent-A-Center
agreement was unconscionable, the arbitrator or a court? At present there a two
possible kinds of arbitration agreement enforceability challenges: one specifically
challenges the enforceability of the arbitration agreement and the other challenges
the contract in its entirety.68 Because Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act states
that an arbitration provision is enforceable without reference to the validity of the
contract in which it is contained,69 a challenge to a contract in its entirety does not
prevent enforcement of the specific agreement to arbitrate.70
The fact that the agreements to arbitrate are severable, however, does not
mean they cannot be challenged. If a party specifically challenges the agreement to
65

Rent-A-Center W., 130 S. Ct. at 2777 (referencing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); First
Options of Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)).
66
Rent-A-Ctr, W., 130 S. Ct. at 2777-78.
67
Id. at 2778 (citing First Options of Chi., 514 U.S. at 938; AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc’n
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
68
Id. (citing Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006)).
69
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2008) (providing that “[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or
a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract”).
70
Rent-A-Center, W., 130 S. Ct. at 2778.

ARBITRATION UNDER ATTACK

111

arbitrate, then a federal court must consider that challenge.71 Because arbitration is
a matter of consent, a court must first decide if parties agreed to arbitration. But if
the challenge goes to the entire contract within which the arbitration agreement is
contained, then the arbitrator resolves the issue.
The Court’s analysis to this point was not new and had been clearly
articulated in earlier cases. So why was it necessary for the Court to address the
issue in Rent-A-Center? The agreement to arbitrate employment disputes was the
only contract in Rent-A-Center, the arbitration agreement was not the subsection of
a larger contract. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had concluded that
because the agreement to arbitrate was the only contract, then a challenge to that
contract is a challenge to the arbitration provision itself.72
The United States Supreme Court was unwilling to accept this modestly
expansive interpretation of its prior holdings. The Court insisted that its rule had to
be applied strictly and literally. Only when a party challenges the “precise
agreement to arbitrate,” must a court consider that challenge before ordering
arbitration.73 The rule does not depend upon the type of contract in issue. The fact
that the only contract in Rent-A-Center was actually an arbitration agreement
makes no difference. An agreement to arbitrate enforceability disputes is severable
from an overlying agreement to arbitrate discrimination disputes and the agreement
to arbitrate enforceability disputes must be challenged individually and
specifically.
Jackson asserted that because the entire contract was unconscionable, the
provision delegating decisional power to the arbitrator was meaningless. But
because Jackson argued the entire contract was unconscionable, the arbitrator
decides the issue. Justice Stevens’s dissent, which was joined by three other
Justices74 and which criticizes the majority opinion on several different points,

71

Id.
Jackson v. Rent-A-Ctr W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912. 918-919 (2009).
73
Rent-A-Center, W., 130 S. Ct. at 2778.
74
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor.
72
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echoes the words of the Ninth Circuit in one important respect. According to
Stevens, the subject matter of this contract was exclusively arbitration and any
challenge to the contract itself is necessarily a challenge to the arbitration
agreement.75 In other words, “[t]hey are one and the same.”76
1.

Rent-A-Center – Deference on the Front End

Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel
77

subsequently has led to inconsistent interpretations in the United States Court of

Appeals,78 at least initially it appeared the Court had established a clear rule that
Federal Arbitration Act "§§10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive
grounds for expedited vacatur and modification.”79
If judicial review is severely limited, then the issue of which questions the
arbitrator decides becomes critical. There will not be a second look. Rent-A-Center
champions freedom of contract when it confirms that parties can direct arbitrability
questions to the arbitrator and away from the judicial system. The Court
announced what appears to be a literal test. Challenge the enforceability of a
contract that contains an arbitration delegation clause, and the arbitrator will
resolve that question. Challenge the enforceability of the delegation provision itself
and the court decides.
But if the goal is to protect freedom of contract, one has to ask – in Rent-ACenter was the Court protecting a contract that truly was freely negotiated?
Should we “bend over backwards” and meticulously distinguish, separate and
protect delegation provisions in all contracts, even adhesion contracts? Did
Jackson actually intend to reserve this question for the arbitrator? And do we want
as many cases as possible to go to arbitration?
75

Rent-A-Center, W., 130 S. Ct. at 2786-2787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77
Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
78
A split of authority has developed in the United States Courts of Appeal.
79
Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 577.
76
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A strong argument can be made that the Supreme Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence is becoming less principled and more result oriented. The Supreme
Court wants cases to be decided by arbitrators. At the beginning of a dispute, when
determining who makes initial decisions, the Court appears determined to give
arbitrators substantial authority. It is not unreasonable to suggest that in “budget
challenged” times the Court has little choice. Appellate and trial court judges alike
are going to be very deferential towards arbitration on the front end; that being,
when determining whether judges or arbitrators get the first bite at the apple.
The question then becomes what happens when an arbitral award is issued?
Will the Court be as deferential when it comes to judicial review?
B.

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp80 (Stolt-Nielsen)

arose out of a situation in which AnimalFeeds International Corp. was shipping
goods using a standard contract (commonly called a Charter Party) that included an
arbitration clause.81 The clause contained the following language:
Arbitration.

Any

dispute

arising

from

the

making,

performance or termination of this Charter Party shall be
settled in New York, Owner and Charterer each appointing
an arbitrator, who shall be a merchant, broker or individual
experienced in the shipping business; the two thus chosen, if
they cannot agree, shall nominate a third arbitrator who shall
be an Admiralty lawyer. Such arbitration shall be conducted
in conformity with the provisions and procedure of the
United States Arbitration Act [i.e., the FAA], and a judgment

80
81

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
Id. at 1764-65.
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of the Court shall be entered upon any award made by said
arbitrator.82

A Department of Justice investigation revealed an illegal price-fixing conspiracy
that led to a class action lawsuit and the parties agreed they must arbitrate.83 The
parties then agreed to let arbitrators decide whether the arbitration agreement
permits class arbitration, stipulating that the agreement was “silent” with regard to
class arbitration.84
The parties agreed to submit the class arbitration question to three
arbitrators who were to “follow and be bound by Rules 3 through 7 of the
American

Arbitration

Arbitrations.”

85

Association’s

Supplementary

Rules

for

Class

Rule 3 directs the arbitrators to decide whether the arbitration

clause permits class arbitration.86 Based on a) post Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Bazzle87 arbitral awards permitting class arbitration (but not mentioning whether
those awards were based on the Federal Arbitration Act, New York law, or
maritime law) and b) the lack of evidence of an intent to preclude class arbitration,
the panel allowed class arbitration.88
When Stolt-Nielsen filed an application in district court to vacate the
award, the district court determined that the arbitrators acted in “manifest disregard
of the law” and vacated the award.89 The court explained that the arbitrators should
have used choice of law analysis and applied federal maritime law requiring that
contracts be interpreted according to custom and usage.90

82

Id. at 1765.
Id.
84
Id. at 1766.
85
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765 (internal quotations omitted).
86
Id.
87
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
88
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1766.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first agreed
with the district court that the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law survived
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.91 The
Second Circuit reversed the district court, however, and held that because no
authority applying a maritime rule or New York law against class arbitration was
cited, the arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded the law.92 There was nothing
in New York case law that prohibited class arbitration.93
The United States Supreme Court was not persuaded by the Second
Circuit. The Court declared that the arbitrators’ award must be vacated because the
arbitrators had exceeded their authority and imposed their own policy choice
instead of ruling based on the Federal Arbitration Act, maritime law, or New York
law.94
The Court explained that when an arbitration clause is “silent,” the
arbitration panel must identify the governing rule of law and should assume that
the parties intend default rules to control.95 An arbitration panel cannot ignore the
fact that class arbitration is significantly different than bilateral arbitration when
one considers cost, speed, and privacy.96 And even though the same limited rules
of judicial review apply to class arbitration that apply to bilateral arbitration, the
stakes are as high as they are in class action litigation.97 Therefore, because
arbitration is a matter of consent, class arbitration simply cannot be imposed when
the parties stipulate, as they did in this case, that they have not reached an
agreement on this issue.98
The dissent maintains that the majority acted much too aggressively and
engaged in an improper de novo review of an award issued by experienced
91

Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2777.
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1758, 1766.
93
Id. at 1766-67.
94
Id. at 1768-69.
95
Id. at 1770.
96
Id. at 1776.
97
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1776.
98
Id.
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arbitrators that had been selected by the parties.99 According to the dissent, the
panel decided only that the arbitration clause used in the parties’ shipping contracts
permits class arbitration.100 The award was abstract, highly interlocutory, and did
not decide if AnimalFeed’s claims were appropriate for class action.101 Nor did the
arbitrators identify any class or determine whether potential class members should
be required to opt-in to the proceedings.102 This was a preliminary award,
emphasized the dissent, and judicial review cannot be expanded by labeling it
“Partial Final Award.”

103

In fact, allowing piecemeal review of this nature will

have the undesirable result of making arbitration more like litigation.104 Judicial
intervention by the majority at this juncture, asserted the dissent, was premature
and violates the firm final-judgment rule of the federal court system.105
The dissent appears to believe strongly that the parties did agree to be
bound by the arbitrators’ award and that, contrary to its explanation and analysis,
the majority is rejecting the principle that arbitration is a matter of consent.
The dissent argued that the arbitrators’ award was the determination to
which the parties agreed, that the award was within the submission, that the award
was an honest decision, and that there had been a full and fair hearing.106 Federal
Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(4) asks if arbitrators had the power to decide a
particular issue.107 The dissent was convinced that the parties’ supplemental
agreement referring the class arbitration question to the arbitrators unquestionably

99

Id. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101
Id. at 1778 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1778 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Metallgesellschaft A.G. v. M/V Capitan
Constante, 790 F.2d 280, 283-285. (2nd Cir. 1986) (Feinberg, J., dissenting)).
105
Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106
See id. at 1780 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reciting grounds for vacatur as articulated in
Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349, 17 How. 344, 349, 15 L.Ed. 96 (1855), subsequently
codified in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), and concluding that vacatur was not appropriate in StoltNielsen).
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See supra note 29 for the text of The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10.
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gave the arbitrators the power to decide whether class arbitrations are permitted.108
Additionally, the panel was convinced that the arbitration panel did not ignore the
relevant law. In fact, according to the dissent, the arbitrators clearly explained that
their decision to focus on the wording of the arbitration agreement as a basis for
deciding whether the parties intended to permit class action was consistent with
New York and maritime law.109
Stolt-Nielsen was a five to three decision in which Justice Sotomayer did
not participate. Although the Supreme Court acknowledges that arbitrators have
the authority to adopt procedures necessary to implement parties’ agreements,
authorizing class actions without an expression of consent is not a mere procedural
decision.110 In simple terms, class actions change the agreement.
The majority and dissenting justices analyze the question of whether the
arbitral panel acted appropriately quite differently. The dissent believes that the
arbitrators did not ignore the relevant law and, in fact, expressly explained that
they acted based on their interpretation of New York law as articulated by the New
York Court of Appeals.111 According to their interpretation of the law, the
arbitrators believed that they should concentrate on the language of the arbitration
clause.112
Revealing a significantly different interpretation of the facts, the majority
asserts that the arbitrators ignored the relevant law and that the arbitrators acted
based upon their own version of sound policy.113 And perhaps more importantly in
the long term, the majority thought it was necessary to intervene and vacate an
arbitral award in spite of the dissent’s argument that such intervention was
premature and, in fact, interfered with the decision process the parties had chosen.

108

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1780 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
110
Id. at 1776.
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Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The Stolt-Nielsen majority’s reference to Hall Street Associates v. Mattel

also is noteworthy. Although it was possible, and perhaps reasonable, to conclude
after Hall Street courts no longer could cite manifest disregard of the law as a basis
for vacating an arbitral award, in Stolt-Nielsen the Court announces that “[w]e do
not decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives … Hall Street Associates … as an
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for
vacatur set for at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”114 The Court recites AnimalFeeds’
characterization of the standard as requiring proof that the arbitrators “knew of the
relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of
the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing
to apply it.”115 Assuming for the purposes of argument that the standard applied,
the Court found that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the law in this
case.116
1.

Stolt-Nielsen – Deference on the Back End

During the earlier discussion of Rent-A-Center, the author suggested that
on the front end; that being, before the arbitration begins, courts will be very
deferential to arbitration. But Stolt-Nielsen suggests that on the back end, after
arbitration has ended and an award has issued, courts will be much more willing to
intervene. And the suggestion that manifest disregard of the law may still be
available in spite of Hall Street indicates that the Court wants to ensure a fairly
robust power of review. The Court, frankly, may not like all of the arbitral awards
generated by its liberal deferral policy at the initiation of arbitration and may want
to ensure that it has the power to vacate or reform awards that do not provide the
results that the Court would prefer. The dissent in Stolt-Nielsen argues that the
Court acted improperly and interfered with the dispute resolution process that the
114

Id. at 1768.
Id.
116
Id.
115

ARBITRATION UNDER ATTACK

119

parties had chosen. An important question is whether Stolt-Nielsen will have a
dramatic impact or whether its application will be limited. While explaining that
the arbitrators simply had imposed their own version of sound policy, the Court
stated that the arbitrators should not have ignored industry custom and usage
because those practices can reveal intent behind silence.117 In Stolt-Nielsen there
was evidence that a) sophisticated business parties b) in this particular industry
always avoid class arbitration.118 These facts should limit Stolt-Nielsen in future
cases. Silence should be interpreted differently when the parties either are not
similarly sophisticated or the evidence on custom and usage is not as one-sided.
If one suspects that the Court to is attempting to preserve, or even expand,
the ability to review arbitration awards with which the Court disagrees, then in
order to confirm or dispel that suspicion one has to consider the Court’s possible
motivations. Why should one suspect that the Court is comfortable giving
arbitrators the first opportunity to resolve the dispute only so long as it gets to take
a second look?
It might be, as the NLRB General Counsel explains in its recommended
change in arbitral deferral policy, that the Court wants to ensure that statutory
rights, especially civil rights, are protected. But recall that the Supreme Court
interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964119 so narrowly that Congress
had to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1991.120 Although the membership of the
Supreme Court has changed since 1989, the time of the Supreme Court decisions121
117

Id. at 1769.
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1769.
119
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17.
120
P.L. 102 – 166, 105 Stat. 1071.
121
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (current employees alleging
unlawful racial harassment cannot recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because harassment is
not included in the protection provided for “making and enforcing contracts”); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (employers’ burden to prove business
necessity in a disparate impact discrimination lawsuit identified as merely a burden of
production (although prior cases had described the burden as one of persuasion)); Lorance
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (the time limit for claiming unlawful
discrimination based on a facially neutral seniority system begins to run at the time the
seniority system is first adopted, not when the plaintiffs later are demoted as result of that
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that prompted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the author does not believe that most
commentators would argue that the Supreme Court has become more concerned
with protecting individual civil rights. In fact, more recently the Court so
thoroughly eviscerated the Americans with Disabilities Act122 that Congress
concluded that it needed to enact the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act123 to restore the intent and promise of the original Americans with Disabilities
Act.
One might suggest that the Court believes arbitrators are inclined, although
not guaranteed, to make pro-business decisions. This suggestion, of course,
justifies an entirely separate article. But it is not reckless to suggest that arbitrators,
who tend to be successful professionals and business people, and who may be
subject to the controversial “repeat player” phenomenon,124 might be predisposed
(perhaps subconsciously if not consciously) to favor business interests. So the
Court is comfortable construing arbitration clauses broadly to give arbitrators the
first opportunity. But if the arbitrator strays, the Court wants to be able to adjust
the arbitrators’ awards.
C.

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
Although we do not yet have a decision, it makes sense in the context of

this article to make a few observations regarding a case pending before the United

system); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (if an employee proves that
membership in a protected class was a motivating factor for an adverse employment action,
then the employer can avoid all liability by proving it would have made the same decision
even though discrimination was a motivating factor); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)
(although white fire fighters did not intervene when consent decrees were being entered in
earlier employment discrimination proceedings, the firefighters still could challenge
employment decisions taken pursuant to those decrees).
122
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
123
P.L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
124
See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL 189 (1997) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324411.
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States Supreme Court, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.125 Although it is risky,
perhaps even foolish, to predict the outcome in Supreme Court cases, recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding arbitration may provide helpful insights.
The case involves a consumer class action alleging AT&T advertised a
second phone for free but then fraudulently charged tax on the “free phone.”126 The
service contract that consumers signed stated that, “CINGULAR and you agree
that no Arbitrator has the authority to (1) award relief in excess of what this
agreement provides; (2) award punitive damages or any other damages not
measured by the prevailing party's actual damages; or (3) order consolidation or
class arbitration.”

127

Nevertheless, a lawsuit was filed and subsequently AT&T

revised the arbitration agreement with additional language favoring consumers.128
The revised agreement states that if a customer prevails in arbitration and
receives more than AT&T’s final offer, AT&T will pay $7500.00 plus double
attorney fees.129 Consumers have the right to pursue punitive damages; a
convenient venue; in-person, telephone or desk arbitration; and a waiver of
AT&T’s right to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.130
The District Court found the agreement unconscionable,131 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed,132 and Ninth Circuit added that the Federal Arbitration Act does
not preempt California unconscionability law.133 The question pending before the
Supreme Court asks “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts States from
conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of
particular procedures - here, class-wide arbitration - when those procedures are not
125

130 S.Ct. 3322, 176 L.Ed.2d 1218.
Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter AT&T
Mobility].
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Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255 (S.D. Cal.) at *2 (Not Reported in
F.Supp.2d).
128
AT&T Mobility, 584 F 3d. at 853.
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Id.
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necessary to ensure that the parties to the arbitration agreement are able to
vindicate their claims.” 134
AT&T is arguing that California courts apply unconscionability doctrine
more strictly when they review arbitral class action prohibitions.135 The Ninth
Circuit had found the $7500.00 dollar promise did not save the agreement and was,
in fact, irrelevant because, to avoid that cost, AT&T’s final offer will be the face
amount of the claim.136 The specific question in this case thus becomes, when
determining unconscionability, should a court consider effects on individuals other
than the named plaintiffs and should the goal of deterrence be considered?
The case raises freedom of contract issues that have been determinative in
recent cases and it has significant implications for consumers and employees (for
example, regarding wage and hour claims). Large classes consisting of individuals
who each possess small dollar amount claims arguably do not have an effective
remedy available unless arbitration class actions are available. So what will happen
in AT&T Mobility?
The Supreme Court has declared that parties may draft arbitration
agreements that define the rules under which the arbitration will proceed.137 And
the Court appears to be adopting a deferential approach to arbitration at the
initiation stage. But the Court believes class arbitration should be treated
differently because it is distinguishable from bilateral arbitration in terms of speed,
cost, privacy and damages. Emphasizing these differences, the Court in StoltNielsen held that class arbitration cannot be compelled unless the parties expressly
consent.
A very likely outcome in AT&T Mobility is that the Court will enforce the
contract as written, class arbitration will not be allowed, and AT&T will win this
case. When the Court refuses to allow class arbitration it can be argued that the
134

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2010 WL 302265.
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Court is not nearly as deferential to arbitration on the “front end” as the author
maintains. If what the author suggests is true, then one would think that the Court
would be more than happy to let arbitrators assume the burden of managing class
actions.
The AT&T Mobility decision can be reconciled with the author’s
assertions, however. Although the Court will not permit (defer to) class arbitrations
in this instance, the Court will defer to the parties’ choice as expressly articulated
in their arbitration agreement. Although the specific result in AT&T Mobility will
be that one type of arbitration (class action) will not be allowed, this decision will
be consistent with the freedom of contract and FAA preemption principles that
ordinarily lead the court to defer to arbitration at the initial stages of a dispute. The
Court will be acting consistently because it will defer to the arbitration agreement
on the front end.138
But this case will not change the fact that after an arbitration award has
issued, the Court is not giving freedom of contract principles the same weight
when it comes to the question of whether the Court should leave an arbitral award
undisturbed. After an award has issued the Court appears to be less concerned with
protecting the agreement to which the parties consented and more concerned with
ensuring that the result is one with which the Court agrees. If the case is decided as
the author anticipates, this decision will give new life to the currently stalled
Arbitration Fairness Act.
VI.

CONCLUSION
Arbitration is under attack, but it will survive. To meet their obligation to

deliver justice in a timely manner, budget stressed judicial systems that no longer
can process cases in a prompt and effective manner have no choice. They must
138

The author also believes that a decision limiting the availability of class arbitration,
which the Court has described as significantly different than the bilateral arbitration it
favors, is a result with which the Court will be very comfortable.

124

ARBITRATOR AS JUDGE… AND JUDGE OF JURISDICTION SYMPOSIUM

create rules and issue judicial opinions that will ensure arbitration remains a viable
alternative. And as our society becomes more technology dependent, arbitration is
positioned to thrive because technology facilitated communication mediums can be
integrated easily and seamlessly into arbitration processes. Although recently
enacted and pending legislation limits, and even prohibits, arbitration in certain
circumstances, the arbitration agreements that generated this legislative response
are being revised and the momentum for additional legislative change appears to
be dissipating, at least for the moment.
But it is becoming increasingly difficult to anticipate what the boundaries
and limits of arbitration will be in the future. Rent-A-Center v. Jackson indicates
that courts, citing freedom of contract, will be very deferential to arbitration at the
initiation stage, or the “front end.” But Stolt Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corporation suggests that courts will be much less deferential when
it comes to reviewing and vacating arbitral awards, “the back end.” Courts will be
less deferential even though the same freedom of contract principle relied on in
Rent-A-Center supports the argument that the courts should leave the award, the
result of the process the parties chose, alone.
The idea that the Supreme Court is developing an increasingly resultoriented approach to arbitral award reviewability may be quite cynical. But a Court
that is very willing to give arbitrators great leeway to resolve disputes in the first
instance may have second thoughts about losing control. The Court may want to
guarantee that the final result is one with which it is comfortable. If courts are
going to rule in ways that ensure the viability of arbitration because of the
judiciary’s financial problems, and if the Supreme Court is going to construct an
award reviewability approach designed to guarantee that it will get a second look
at a dispute that was first deferred to arbitration, then it will be increasingly
difficult to articulate a principled theory that explains the scope and intent of
judicial review.

